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ABSTRACT
The arm race between spambots and spambot-detectors is made
of several cycles (or generations): a new wave of spambots is cre-
ated (and new spam is spread), new spambot filters are derived
and old spambots mutate (or evolve) to new species. Recently, with
the diffusion of the adversarial learning approach, a new practice
is emerging: to manipulate on purpose target samples in order to
make stronger detection models. Here, we manipulate generations
of Twitter social bots, to obtain - and study - their possible future
evolutions, with the aim of eventually deriving more effective de-
tection techniques. In detail, we propose and experiment with a
novel genetic algorithm for the synthesis of online accounts. The
algorithm allows to create synthetic evolved versions of current
state-of-the-art social bots. Results demonstrate that synthetic bots
really escape current detection techniques. However, they give all
the needed elements to improve such techniques, making possible
a proactive approach for the design of social bot detection systems.
KEYWORDS
Social bots, online social networks security, adversarial classifier
evasion, genetic algorithms, Twitter
ACM Reference Format:
Stefano Cresci, Marinella Petrocchi, Angelo Spognardi, and Stefano Tog-
nazzi. 2019. Better Safe Than Sorry: an Adversarial Approach to improve
Social Bot Detection. In Proceedings of ACM Web Science Conference 2019
(WebSci 2019). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 11 pages.
1 INTRODUCTION
A worrying peculiarity of spammers and bots (or spambots) is
that they evolve over time, adopting sophisticated techniques to
evade well-established detection systems [12, 49]. In the context
of Online Social Networks (ONSs), newer social spambots often
feature advanced characteristics that make them way harder to
detect with respect to older ones, since capable of mimicking human
behaviors and interaction patterns better than ever before [12, 20].
These automated accounts represent – to the best of the literature
knowledge – the third and most novel generation of social bots,
following the original wave dated back in the 00s, and passing
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through a second generation dated around 2011 [49]. The latest
social bots are capable of sharing (credible) fake news, inflating the
popularity of OSN users, and reshaping political debates [40, 41].
Given this picture, it is not surprising that evolution mechanisms
(together with coordination and synchronization ones) represent
one of the key factors that currently allow malicious accounts to
massively tamper with our social ecosystems [14].
Despite malicious accounts evolution representing a sort of Pan-
dora’s box, little to no attention has been posed towards studying –
and possibly anticipating – such evolution. In fact, in past years,
as social bots gradually became clever in escaping detection, schol-
ars and OSNs administrators tried to keep pace (i.e., reacted), by
proposing ever more complex detection techniques, as described in
the Related Work section. The natural consequence of this reactive
approach – according to which a new technique is designed only
after having collected evidence of new mischiefs of evolved bots –
is that researchers and OSN admins are constantly one step behind
the bot developers [43].
The classification task of recognising if an online account is gen-
uine or not is adversarial in nature, being focused on distinguishing
bad samples from good ones. Nonetheless, a new approach is gain-
ing momentum in the wide field of artificial intelligence, leveraging
the concept of adversarial learning: the automatic learning within
a hostile environment [28]. This allows to both discover vulnera-
bilities in learning algorithms and to test algorithmic techniques
which yield more robust learning [44]. Intuitively, the evolution of
new waves of social bots can be seen as a problem of adversarial
classifier evasion, where the attacker changes the generated samples
to evade detection. Thus, the core idea of this paper is to manipulate
on purpose target samples in order to produce stronger detection
models. Inspired by the adversarial learning approach, for the first
time to the best of our knowledge, we carry out an exploratory in-
vestigation to define and implement a proactive technique to study
and detect evolving social bots.
Specifically, we aim at answering the following critical, yet un-
explored, research questions:
RQ1 – Can we develop an analytical framework for simulating
spambot evolutions?
RQ2 – Can we use such framework for synthesizing new genera-
tions of spambots? And, most importantly, are these evolved spambots
capable of going undetected by state-of-the-art techniques?
RQ3 – Can we leverage this proactive and adversarial study of
spambot evolutions to improve current detection techniques?
Approach.Our methodological approach to answer the three ques-
tions stems from the so-called digital DNA technique [11], where
the behavioral lifetime of an account is encoded as a sequence of
characters, built according to the chronological sequence of actions
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performed by the account. The adoption of this behavioral mod-
eling technique offers a DNA-like representation for the lifetime
of each account, including new social spambots. We feed the DNA
sequences to a custom-designed genetic algorithm, so as to study
possible evolutions of the accounts [36]. The customized genetic
algorithm iteratively selects the best evolutions, so as to converge
towards synthetic bots capable of resembling behavioral character-
istics of legitimate accounts. Furthermore, by constraining possible
evolutions within the algorithm, the approach allows to obtain
synthetic accounts capable of performing specific tasks (e.g., viral
marketing, message spamming, mass retweeting, etc.). Notably, the
digital DNA behavioral modeling technique has been exploited in
the past as the building block of a state-of-the-art detection sys-
tem [13]. Thus, we can also apply such detection technique on
the synthetically evolved accounts, to evaluate whether they are
capable of evading detection.
Contributions. This work contributes along several dimensions.
Firstly, (i) we propose GenBot, a novel genetic algorithm specifi-
cally designed for social spambot evolutions. By employing a cost
function that quantifies the difference between a new generation
of spambots and a group of legitimate accounts, GenBot is capable
of generating spambots whose behavior is similar to that of the
legitimate ones. Notably, our results outperform previous attempts
to simulate the behavior of human accounts [16]. Then, (ii) we dis-
cuss the design of an analytical framework for simulating possible
social spambot evolutions that leverages both the digital DNA be-
havioral modeling technique and the genetic algorithm previously
defined. We experiment with this framework to synthesize a novel
generation of evolved spambots, with the aim of producing adver-
sarial samples. Furthermore, (iii) we assess the extent to which the
newly synthesized social bots are detected by 3 state-of-the-art
techniques. Results show that, with the proposed framework, it is
possible to create an adversarial behavioral fingerprint that allow
bots to escape detection. Finally, (iv) by studying the characteristics
of the synthetic evolved spambots, we draw useful insights into
which account features could be considered in order to improve
the detection of real evolving spambots.
Broadening the approach. We ground our study on a recently-
proposed proactive approach to spambot detection [43]. In order to
carry out extensive experimentation on real-world data, without
loss of generality, here we implement it by focusing on the behavior
(i.e., the sequences of actions that accounts perform) of spambots
and legitimate accounts. This choice opens up the possibility to
leverage, for our experiments, the digital DNA behavioral modeling
technique [11] as well as the social fingerprinting spambot detection
technique [13]. However, despite this particular implementation of
the proactive approach, similar analyses could be carried out, by
relying on different modeling and spambot detection techniques,
such as those based on network/graph analysis and those based on
content analysis.
Reproducibility. Both the data1 and the code2 used in this study
are publicly available for scientific purposes.
1http://mib.projects.iit.cnr.it/dataset.html
2http://sysma.imtlucca.it/tools/digdna-genetic-algorithm/
Figure 1: Excerpt of a digital DNA extraction process for a
Twitter user with the alphabet B = {A,C,T}, where T is as-
signed to every tweet, C to every reply, and A to every retweet.
2 BACKGROUND AND NOTATION
Here, we provide a succinct description of the main concepts re-
lated to digital DNA sequences and genetic algorithms, as well as
notations and metrics adopted in the remainder of this study.
2.1 Digital DNA
Digital DNA sequences.We define a digital DNA sequence s as
a row-vector of characters (i.e., a string),
s = (b1,b2, . . . ,bn ) bi ∈ B ∀ i = 1, . . . ,n
Characters bi in s are also called the (DNA) bases and are drawn
from a finite set B, called alphabet,
B = {B1,B2, . . . ,BN } ∀ i , j : Bi , Bj
Online users’ behaviors can be represented by encoding each user
action, in chronological order, with an appropriate base. In this way,
we obtain the sequence of characters that makes up the digital DNA
sequence of the user. For example, Figure 1 shows the process of
extracting the digital DNA sequence of a Twitter user, by scanning
its timeline according to the alphabet B = {A, C, T}, where T is
assigned to every tweet, C to every reply, and A to every retweet.
A digital DNA sequence can be represented, then, with a compact
string like s = . . . TTATCT. Additional details about the theoretical
foundations of digital DNA can be found in [11, 13].
Similarity between digital DNA sequences. In order to analyze
groups of users rather than single users, we need to study multiple
digital DNA sequences as a whole. A group A ofM = |A| users can
be described by the strings representing the digital DNA sequences
of theM users.
To perform our analyses on digital DNA sequences, we can
rely on recent advances in the fields of bio-informatics and string
mining [23]. One of the possible means to quantify similarities
between sequential data representations is the longest common
substring [3]. Given two strings, si of length n and sj of lengthm,
their longest common substring (henceforth LCS) is the longest
string that is a substring of both si and sj . For example, given
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Figure 2: LCS curve of a group of legitimate (human-
operated) accounts.
si = MASSACHUSETTS and sj = PARACHUTE, their LCS is the string
ACHU and the LCS length is 4. The extended version of this problem,
which considers an arbitrary finite number of strings, is called
the k-common substring problem [9]. In this case, given a vector
A = (s1, . . . , sM ) of M strings, the problem is that of finding the
LCS that is common to at least k of these strings, for each 2 ≤
k ≤ M . Notably, both the longest common substring and the k-
common substring problems can be solved in linear time and space,
by resorting to the generalized suffix tree and by implementing
state-of-the-art algorithms, such as those proposed in [3]. Given
that, in the k-common substring problem, the LCS is computed for
each 2 ≤ k ≤ M , it is possible to plot a LCS curve, showing the
relationship between the length of the LCS and the number k of
strings [13].
Figure 2 depicts the LCS curve computed for a group of legitimate
(human-operated) Twitter accounts, via the alphabet B = {A, C, T}.
On the x axis is reported the number k of accounts (corresponding
to the k digital DNA sequences used to compute LCS values) and
on the y axis the length of the LCS common to at least k accounts.
Therefore, each point in a LCS curve corresponds to a subset of k
accounts that share the longest substring (of length y) among all
those shared between all the other possible subsets of k accounts.
A LCS curve is a representation of the behavioral similarities
among a group of users, since it is an ordered sequence of sub-
string lengths. To obtain a single value as measure of similarity for
the whole group, we can compute the area under the LCS curve
(AUC) [19, 21]. Since LCS curves are discrete functions defined over
the [2,M] range, their AUC can be computed straightaway, without
approximations, with the following trapezoid rule,
AUC =
M∑
k=3
(LCS[k − 1] + LCS[k])∆k
2 (1)
Compared to LCS, the definition of AUC, given in Equation (1),
allows to quantitatively and directly compare the overall behavioral
similarity among different groups. This notion of AUC is exploited
in Section 5 to evaluate the results of this study.
2.2 Genetic algorithms
Genetic algorithms [36] represent a popular meta-heuristic tech-
nique to solve optimization problems. It is inspired by the natural
evolution, in which only the best candidates of some species sur-
vive across several subsequent generations. Starting from a random
sample of candidate solutions (a so-called population of individuals),
only the best ones are elected to evolve. Similarly to what happens
in nature, through a mechanism of recombination and mutation
of those individuals, a new generation is obtained. This evolved
generation is expected to have a better quality with respect to the
previous one. The quality of individuals is evaluated by associating
a fitness score to all of them. The score is computed by a given fit-
ness function that is designed according to the task at hand. During
each generation, the current population is modified via either a
single input function called mutation or a two input function called
crossover. The outputs of these functions are called offsprings and
a new generation is formed by merging some of the individuals
from the previous generation with some of the offsprings. In our
experimental scenario, when we refer to an individual, we refer
to a group of users. Thus, our population is composed of different
groups of users that evolve passing from a generation to the next
one.
Notations.We call P0 the initial population and Pi the population
at the i-th generation. Given a population Pi ,G j = {u1,u2, . . . ,uM }
is the j-th individual (i.e., a group of users) of Pi . Then,G j [k] = uk
is the k-th user of the groupG j , characterized by its digital DNA se-
quence. In other words, uk is a digital DNA sequence encoding the
behavior of the k-th Twitter user. We definevj as the fitness score of
the j-th individual. The population Pi = {(G1,v1), (G2,v2), . . . , (G J ,v J )}
is a set of pairs containing the individuals and their associated fit-
ness scores.
3 AN ALGORITHM FOR SIMULATING BOT
EVOLUTIONS
The design of a custom genetic algorithm for solving a given task
involves the definition of the parameters and functions used by the
algorithm in its iterative execution. In this section, we first describe
the design choices and building blocks of the GenBot algorithm
and we conclude by defining the algorithm itself.
3.1 Building blocks: fitness, mutation and
crossover
Fitness. In our scenario, individuals of best quality are groups of
bots that best emulate the behavior of a group of legitimate (human-
operated) accounts. To formalize this intuition, we rely on the
notion of behavioral similarity expressed by digital DNA and LCS
curves. More specifically, our goal for this task is to minimize the
distance between the LCS curve (i.e., the behavioral representation)
of a group of legitimate accounts and the LCS curve of a population
of synthetic evolved bots.
We rely on the Kullback-Liebler distance (DKL) to compute the
distance between two LCS curves, since it has already been fruitfully
employed in recent similar work [16, 46]. DKL is an information
theoretic metric that measures how much information is lost when
a target probability distribution PX (x) is approximated by PˆX (x).
In detail, DKL is the symmetric version of the Kullback-Liebler
divergence dKL (defined as, dKL(PˆX , PX ) = ∑x ln ( PˆX (x )PX (x ) ) PˆX (x)),
where,
DKL(PˆX , PX ) = dKL(PX , PˆX ) + dKL(PˆX , PX )2 (2)
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Fit(Gj , b)
1 д ← LCS (Gj )
2 vj ← DKL (д, b)
3 return vj
GCO(Gx ,Gy , r)
1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , r } do
2 Gxy [i] ← Gx [i]
3 Gyx [i] ← Gy [i]
4 for i ∈ {r + 1, . . . , |Gx | } do
5 Gxy [i] ← Gy [i]
6 Gyx [i] ← Gx [i]
7 returnGxy , Gyx
In the GenBot algorithm, the target distribution PX (x) is obtained
from the LCS curve of legitimate accounts, while the approximating
distribution PˆX (x) is obtained from the LCS curve of a group of
bots. The DKL distance is computed by the fitness function Fit(·)
that accepts as input an individual G j and the target LCS curve b
of legitimate accounts. The output is a scalar vj that represents the
fitness score of the individual G j .
Mutation. The mutation is an operator commonly used in many
genetic algorithms [36]. It typically consists in making some bases
of the DNA sequences of an individual to mutate into a different
base (e.g., A mutation−−−−−−−→ C).
Previous studies showed that the distribution of bases within the
digital DNA sequences of legitimate users is not uniform [13, 16].
Quite intuitively, some actions tend to occur more often than others,
such as the tweeting action. For this reason, in GenBotwe design a
mutation operator that favors mutations from the C (replies) and T
(retweets) bases to the A (tweets) base. Nonetheless, also mutations
from A to C and T are possible, although with a lower probability.
Our Mutation(·) function accepts two parameters: Pi , which is the
full population at the i-th generation of the genetic algorithm; and
L, which is the length of the digital DNA sequences. The output
returned by the function is the mutated Pi population.
Mutation(Pi, L)
1 for (Gj , vj ) ∈ Pi do
2 for uk ∈ Gj do
3 for l ∈ {1, . . . , L } do
4 r ← rand()
5 if r < MUT-PROB then
6 if uk [l ] = C or uk [l ] = T then
7 uk [l ] = A
8 else
9 if r < 0.5 then
10 uk [l ] = C
11 else
12 uk [l ] = T
13 return Pi
Crossover. Traditionally, a crossover operator has two parent in-
dividuals as input, and generates two offsprings as the output [36].
The offsprings are obtained via a recombination of the DNA se-
quences of the two parents. Remarkably, in this study an individual
G j is a group of users G j = {u1,u2, . . . ,uM } rather than a single
user with its DNA sequence. Thus, by following the traditional
crossover approach, we have two groups of users as input (the par-
ents) and we obtain two groups of users as output (the offsprings).
Recombinations at this level (i.e., at the group-level) can occur by
mixing users between the two parent groups, rather than by mixing
DNA sequences. Within GenBot, this crossover strategy is imple-
mented with the function GCO(·) (Group CrossOver). GCO(·) uses a
one-point crossover technique. In detail, it randomly selects two
groups Gx ,Gy ∈ Pi as the parents and a random crossover point r .
Then, it generates the offspringGxy as the combination of the first
parent up to point r with the second parent from point r onwards,
and the offspring Gyx viceversa. Figure 3 gives an intuitive idea of
how our group-level crossover operator works.
Since our individuals are composed of many users, we can com-
plement the previous crossover strategywith additional fine-grained
crossovers working at the user-level. Specifically, we define two
user-level crossover operators, referred to as the User CrossOver
operator, defined in function UCO(·), and theUserReverse CrossOver
operator, defined in function URCO(·). Function UCO(·) is a one-point
crossover operator that acts at user-level. Similarly to the GCO(·)
operator, two parents ux ,uy ∈ G j and one crossover point r are
randomly picked. Next, two offsprings – respectively uxy and uyx
– are generated as the combination of the first parent up to point r
with the second parent from point r onwards, and viceversa. Fig-
ure 4 gives an intuitive idea of how our UCO(·) user-level crossover
operator works, in comparison with the group-level crossover.
Function URCO(·) differs from UCO(·) in the way the second parent
uy is exploited. In fact, in URCO(·), the digital DNA sequence of uy
is reversed before being recombined with that of the first parent
ux . This simple operation allows to create much more variability
in the DNA sequences of the offsprings and it demonstrates very
effective in practice.
Contrarily to traditional genetic algorithms, we exploit the rich-
ness of the DNA-based behavioral representations, by designing a
multi-level crossover strategy. At the user-level, the fine-grained
UCO(·) and URCO(·) operators apply recombinations to the DNA se-
quences of single users. Furthermore, at the group-level, the coarse-
grained GCO(·) operator shuffles users between different groups.
UCO(ux , uy , r)
1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , r } do
2 uxy [i] ← ux [i]
3 uyx [i] ← uy [i]
4 for i ∈ {r + 1, . . . , |ux | } do
5 uxy [i] ← uy [i]
6 uyx [i] ← ux [i]
7 return uxy , uyx
URCO(ux , uy , r)
1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , r } do
2 uxy [i] ← ux [i]
3 uyx [i] ← uy [ |uy | − i]
4 for i ∈ {r + 1, . . . , |ux | } do
5 uxy [i] ← uy [ |uy | − i]
6 uyx [i] ← ux [i]
7 return uxy , uyx
3.2 The GenBot algorithm
We implemented GenBot by following the steps of the (1+1)-
evolutionary algorithm scheme [18]. In its simplest definition, a
(1+1)-EA is a randomized hill climbing technique [26] that relies
on mutations only. In the GenBot algorithm, the simple (1+1)-EA
scheme is extended by the adoption of a multi-level crossover strat-
egy (i.e., 1 group-level and 2 user-level crossovers), as previously
defined.
The core of the GenBot algorithm is represented in Algorithm 1
by the for loop at lines 7–37. Each iteration of the loop applies
the mutation and crossover operators to obtain a new generation
of spambots. In detail, the evolutionary steps in GenBot begin
by mutating the current population and continue by substituting
the individuals that improve as a consequence of the mutations.
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Figure 3: Group-level crossover: GCO(·) operator. Figure 4: User-level crossover: UCO(·) operator.
Algorithm 1 GenBot
input : target legitimate groupGlegitimate , initial population P0
output : last generation of evolved spambots Pbest
1 b ← LCS(Glegitimate)
2 U ← numOfUsers(Glegitimate)
3 T ← numOfTweets(Glegitimate)
4 Pbest ← null
5 for Gi ∈ P0 do
6 vi ← Fit(Gi , b) // initial fitness score
7 for i ∈ {1, . . . , MAX-GEN} do
8 mut = Mutation(Pi−1, T ) // apply mutations
9 for mj ∈ mut do
10 mvj ← Fit(mj , b)
11 if mvj < vj then
12 (Gj , vj ) ← (mj ,mvj )
13 for (Gk , vk ) ∈ Pi do
14 x ← rand(1, POP-SIZE)
15 y ← rand(1, POP-SIZE)
16 Gxy ← GCO(Gx , Gy , U ) // apply group crossovers
17 for j ∈ {1, . . . , NUM-URCO} do // apply user reverse crossovers
18 ux ← rand(1, U )
19 uy ← rand(1, U )
20 (uxy , uyx ) ← URCO(Gj [ux ], Gj [uy ], T )
21 Gxy [ux ] ← uxy
22 Gxy [uy ] ← uyx
23 mvk ← Fit(Gxy , b)
24 if mvk < vk then
25 (Gk , vk ) ← (Gxy ,mvk )
26 for (Gk , vk ) ∈ Pi do
27 for j ∈ {1, . . . , NUM-UCO} do // apply user crossovers
28 ux ← rand(1, U )
29 uy ← rand(1, U )
30 (uxy , uyx ) ← UCO(Gj [ux ], Gj [uy ], T )
31 Gxy [ux ] ← uxy
32 Gxy [uy ] ← uyx
33 mvk ← Fit(Gxy , b)
34 if mvk < vk then
35 (Gk , vk ) ← (Gxy ,mvk )
36 Pi+1 ← Pi
37 Pbest ← Pi // update evolved spambots
38 return Pbest
Then, the group-level (coarse-grained) crossover GCO(·) is applied.
Finally, also the 2 user-level (fine-grained) crossovers are applied.
Specifically, at first URCO(·) is applied and the obtained offsprings
are evaluated. Only those offsprings that improved the fitness score
are retained. Subsequently, UCO(·) is applied and the offsprings
are evaluated one last time, thus obtaining a new population that
becomes the starting point of the next iteration of the algorithm.
Notably, traditional evolutionary heuristics based on genetic
algorithms perform only one update of the population at each
iteration of the algorithm. In GenBot however, each generation
is the combination of three intermediate generations, respectively
obtained via (i) mutations, (ii) a combination of group-level and
reverse user-level crossovers, and (iii) user-level crossovers.
4 EXPERIMENTS, SETUP AND EVALUATION
4.1 Dataset
The dataset for this study is composed of the timelines of 3,474
legitimate Twitter accounts.
In order to build this dataset of certified human-operated ac-
counts, random Twitter users were contacted by mentioning them
in tweets. Then, contacted users were asked simple questions in nat-
ural language. Possible answers to such questions were collected by
means of a Twitter crawler3. Upon manually verifying the answers,
all 3,474 accounts that answered were certified as legitimate ones.
Notably, this dataset has already been used in recent works [11–
13, 16] and it is considered an important resource in the field of
spambot and automation detection.
4.2 Experimental setup
The GenBot algorithm is implemented in C++ and the code is
publicly available for scientific purposes (link in the introduction).
For an efficient, linear-time computation of the LCS curves, we
rely on an adapted version of the GLCR toolkit4 implementing the
algorithms in [3]. All the experiments ran on a machine with an
Intel Xeon E7-4830v4, with a 64-bits architecture at 2 GHz, 112 cores
and 500 GB of RAM. As the reference with which to compare our
results, we consider the last (most recent) 2,000 actions performed
by the legitimate accounts in our dataset.
We run GenBot with a population of 30 individuals per run
(POP-SIZE) and a generation limit of 20,000 epochs as a stopping
criterion (MAX-GEN). The initial population P0 is composed of 30
identical individuals. Each individual represents a group of accounts
and the starting point for all the individuals is a DNA sequence of
length 2,000 (same DNA length of the legitimate accounts), whose
first 1,000 positions are filled with the DNA base A, followed by
500 positions filled with the base C and the last 500 positions filled
with the base T. Regarding the mutation operator, the probability
to mutate each action is set equal to 0.0002 (MUT-PROB). For
each generation simulated by GenBot, a total of 30 offsprings are
3https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs
4https://www.uni-ulm.de/in/theo/research/seqana.html
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generated via group-level crossovers. Concerning the user-level
crossovers, for each individual 2 offsprings are generated via the
URCO(·) operator (NUM-URCO), while 12 offsprings are generated
via the UCO(·) operator (NUM-UCO). Each experiment is repeated 5
times and each run of the algorithm starts with a different random
seed. Results are averaged across the 5 runs.
4.3 Experimental evaluation
In the next section, we provide results for our experiments. In
each experiment, the quality of the solutions generated by the
the GenBot algorithm is evaluated by comparing the LCS curve of
the last generation of spambots with that of the reference group.
The LCS curve of the last generation of spambots is computed by
applying the point-to-point average of all the LCS curves of the
spambots groups constituting the last generation. We give both a
qualitative and a quantitative evaluation of the results, as follows:
(i) we provide a graphical comparison of LCS curves, giving a direct
and intuitive insight into the quality of our results; (ii) we compute
and compare the AUC of the LCS curves with Equation (1); (iii) we
measure the distance between the LCS curves by means of the DKL
defined in Equation (2).
5 RESULTS
The last generation of spambots generated by GenBot (i.e., the one
under evaluation) is referred to as evolved spambots.
5.1 Behavioral analysis of evolved spambots
Here, we evaluate the extent to which the evolved spambots gener-
ated by GenBot are capable of emulating the behavior of legitimate
users. The first – and to the best of our knowledge, unique – scien-
tific attempt to solve this task was documented in [16], where the
authors employed a set of resampling techniques to generate new
behavioral fingerprints, as similar as possible to those of legitimate
users. In order to provide a comparison between GenBot and [16],
we applied the best performing techniques described in [16] to
our dataset. Specifically, 3 types of DNA resampling techniques
were used: (i) a statistical resampling of the digital DNA sequences
of legitimate users based on the average characteristics of those
users (labeled average); (ii) a block permutation with block size = 5
(labeled 5-permutation); and (iii) a block bootstrap with block size
= 5 (labeled 5-bootstrap). For the sake of clarity, Figure 8 pictorially
shows the way to perform a block resampling on a digital DNA
sequence [16].
Qualitative results of this experiment are shown in Figure 5. The
LCS curve of the group of legitimate accounts is labeled benchmark.
As shown, the LCS curve of the spambots generated withGenBot is
almost completely overlapping the benchmark. The only exception
is in the tail of the LCS curve and it is visible in the log-log inset of
Figure 5. The comparison between previous techniques andGenBot
is clearly in favor of the latter. In fact, all previous techniques
greatly struggle to fit the head of the LCS curve, while instead they
perform better in the tail. To this regard, our approach and those
described in [16] seem to be complementary, with our GenBot
algorithm capable of fitting all the LCS curve except for the tail,
which instead is well fit by the resampling approaches of [16]. One
further improvement could be the adoption of block resampling
strategies in GenBot, adding them to the mutations and crossovers
that we already employ.
A quantitative evaluation of the quality of evolved spambots is
obtained by comparing the AUC of the LCS curves of the spambots
with that of the legitimate accounts. As shown in Table 1, the
spambots obtained with GenBot were able to reproduce the LCS
of legitimate users with a percentage error of only 2.98% in excess.
Instead, all other techniques managed to reproduce only about half
of the behavioral similarities expected within a group of legitimate
accounts.
5.2 Detection of evolved spambots
Going further, we are now interested in evaluating whether the
evolved spambots are able to avoid detection by state-of-the-art
techniques [13]. We design this experiment by replicating the work-
ing conditions of most spambot detection systems – that is, we
focus on the analysis of an unknown group of users that contains
both spambots and legitimate users.
In detail, we start by mixing together part of our evolved spam-
bots with part of the legitimate users. Then, we compare the LCS
curve of the mixed group with that of the legitimate users only.
Figure 6 shows a qualitative result of this comparison. As shown,
the LCS curve of the mixed group lays very close to that of the
legitimate users. In turn, this means that also the mixed group of
evolved spambots and legitimate users still behaves like a group
solely composed of legitimate users. Table 2 presents the compari-
son in terms of AUC values, which quantitatively confirm the result,
although showing a larger error than that reported in the previous
experiment of Table 1.
Finally, we apply 2 state-of-the-art spam and bot detection tech-
niques [13, 35] to the mixed group, and we assess their performance
in detecting the evolved spambots. We compare these results with
those measured while applying the techniques in [13, 35] to a group
of non-evolved spambots. Results are reported in Table 4 and show
that the evolved spambots generated by GenBot largely evade
detection (mean F1 ≃ 0.260). In addition to the techniques tested in
Table 4, we also applied the system in [1] to our evolved spambots.
Similarly to [13, 35], also [1] proves incapable of accurately detect-
ing the evolved bots with Accuracy = 0.495 and MCC = −0.071.
This result is in contrast with previous work [11, 13] where the
detection rate for non-evolved spambots was F1 = 0.923.
5.3 Generalizability
In this section, we evaluate the generalizability of the GenBot algo-
rithm and of the previously shown results. We change the group of
legitimate accounts and we assess whether the evolved spambots
generated by GenBot are still similar to the legitimate accounts.
We first randomly split the original group of legitimate accounts
into 2 disjunct subgroups (labeled Group A and Group B), each sub-
group counting about 50% of the accounts of the original group.
These subgroups are the 2 new references for GenBot to gener-
ate evolved spambots. Then, we compare the behavioral similarity
between the evolved spambots and the subgroup (either Group A
or Group B) used to generate them. Figure 7 shows the results of
a qualitative comparison. Despite the different shape of the LCS
curves of Group A and Group B of legitimate accounts (solid red
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Figure 5: Qualitative analysis
of evolved spambots and com-
parison with previous tech-
niques.
Figure 6: Comparison of the
LCS curve of legitimate users
with that of a mixed group
composed of evolved spam-
bots and legitimate users.
benchmark
genetic algorithmGroup A Group B
Figure 7: Qualitative comparison of evolved spambots
against 2 different groups of legitimate accounts. De-
spite the different shape of the LCS curves of Group
A and Group B, the corresponding evolved spambots
closely match their behavior.
technique AUC % error
benchmark 3961.0 –
average 971.9 −75.46%
5-bootstrap 2001.7 −49.46%
5-permutation 2019.8 −49.01%
genetic algorithm 4079.0 +2.98%
Table 1: Quantitative analy-
sis: comparison with previ-
ous techniques.
group AUC % error
benchmark (legitimate) 3961.0 –
mixed (bot + legitimate) 3090.2 −21.98%
Table 2: AUC comparison (group
of legitimate users vs mixed
groups: evolved spambots and
legitimate users).
Group A Group B
technique AUC % error AUC % error
benchmark 1797.0 – 1521.50 –
genetic algorithm 2025.6 +12.72% 1632.20 +07.28%
Table 3: Quantitative comparison of evolved
spambots against 2 different groups of legitimate
accounts.
evaluation metrics
technique accounts Precision Recall Specificity Accuracy F1 MCC
Cresci et al. [13] non-evolved spambots 1.000 0.858 1.000 0.929 0.923 0.867
Miller et al. [35] non-evolved spambots 0.555 0.358 0.698 0.526 0.435 0.059
Cresci et al. [13] evolved spambots (GenBot) 0.512 0.210 0.800 0.505 0.298 0.012
Miller et al. [35] evolved spambots (GenBot) 0.720 0.360 0.860 0.610 0.480 0.254
Table 4: Performances of 2 state-of-the-art spam and bot detection techniques to-
wards the detection of non-evolved spambots and evolved spambots generated
with GenBot. The evolved spambots largely go undetected.
DKL
target group mean std
legitimate full 32.64 2.97
legitimate Group A 73.83 11.44
legitimate Group B 34.16 2.33
Table 5: Variability of our results
across 5 runs of our algorithm for dif-
ferent experiments.
Figure 8: Application of block resampling to a digital DNA
sequence, and comparison with one-character resampling.
line), the corresponding evolved spambots closely match their be-
havior. This testifies that even by changing the characteristics of
the accounts to mimic, GenBot is capable of generating spambots
that behave in a similar way with respect to the legitimate ones.
Moreover, this also implies that GenBot is capable of generating
spambots featuring different characteristics. Interestingly, Figure 7
also shows a rather poor performance in fitting the tail of the LCS
curve, similarly to what we already saw in Figure 5. Finally, Ta-
ble 3 reports quantitative results for the 2 subgroups of legitimate
accounts, showing a low percentage error for both groups.
The experiments were executed 5 times, with random seeds
to assess variability. In particular, we measure the mean and the
standard deviation (std) of the distance between the LCS curve of
the evolved spambots generated by GenBot and that of legitimate
accounts, across 5 runs of the algorithm. The distance between
LCS curves is measured by means of the DKL distance defined in
Equation (2). As shown in Table 5, the standard deviation of DKL
is rather low in every experiment, and significantly lower than the
mean, which suggests low variability in the results.
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Figure 9: Beanplot showing the PDF of the normalized Shan-
non entropy of DNA sequences related to evolved spam-
bots and legitimate accounts. DNA sequences of the evolved
spambots feature a suspiciously high entropy.
5.4 Improving current detection techniques
As demonstrated above, the GenBot-generated spambots are able
to avoid actual detection techniques. We can see that collectively,
the evolved spambots do not leave traces of their automated na-
ture, since they accurately reproduce the LCS curve of legitimate
accounts. However, interesting insights can be gained by studying
the single digital DNA sequences of every spambot. Indeed, a close
inspection reveals that the digital DNA sequences of the spambots
generated by GenBot have very few repetitions and almost no reg-
ularities at all5. In turn, such DNA sequences represent very erratic
and heterogeneous behaviors. This finding is in contrast with the
known characteristics of legitimate accounts [13, 16] that tend to
favor certain actions in their behaviors. As a consequence, digital
DNA sequences of legitimate accounts have a prevalence for certain
DNA bases (e.g., the A base for tweets). We formalize this intuition
by relying on the notion of normalized Shannon entropy (Hnorm ).
In particular, we compute the entropy of each digital DNA sequence,
for all the evolved spambots and all the legitimate accounts. Figure 9
shows a beanplot of the empirical probability density function (PDF)
of the normalized entropy, comparing measurements for evolved
spambots with those of legitimate accounts. As expected, the spam-
bots generated by GenBot have mean Hnorm ≃ 1, whereas for
legitimate accounts mean Hnorm = 0.8 (dashed red lines in Fig-
ure 9). A straightforward consequence of this observation is the
possibility to extend current detection techniques based on the
accounts’ behavior, such as [11, 13], by also considering informa-
tion related to the repetitions and regularities within sequences,
thus making current systems more robust against possible future
spambot evolutions. Although limited in scope, this experiment
nonetheless testifies the usefulness – and one among many possible
applications – of the proposed analytical framework for simulating
spambot evolutions.
6 DISCUSSION
Our results demonstrated the possibility to combine the behavioral
representation of digital DNA with the computational framework
5Here we are interested in repetitions within sequences rather than across sequences,
as it was for the case of studying the LCS.
of genetic algorithms, in order to create evolved spambots capable
of escaping current state-of-the-art detection techniques, based on
the accounts’ behavior [13] and on the content of posts [1, 35].
In particular, we designed an analytical framework for simulating
spambot evolutions, thus answering to the first of our research
questions (RQ1). In such framework, social spambots behavior is
modeled via digital DNA. Then, DNA sequences are fed to the
novel genetic algorithm (GenBot), designed to simulate spambot
evolutions. After thousands of subsequent iterations, the output
of GenBot is a novel generation of evolved spambots, described by
their digital DNA. Notably, in this workwe grounded the framework
for simulating possible spambot evolutions on (i) genetic algorithms
and (ii) the recent advances in digital DNA behavioral modeling,
since they currently represent its key enabling factors. However, it
is likely that in the near future the same methodological approach
for studying spambot evolution could leverage different techniques
and methodologies, thus widening its applicability.
Aiming to answer RQ2, we then evaluated the extent to which
the evolved spambots are capable of going undetected by state-of-
the-art techniques. Since our experiments grounded on modeling
the actions in the timelines of the accounts under investigation, it
was natural to consider detection techniques based on accounts
behavior and posted contents. Thus, with regards to the technique
in [13], we showed that (i) the behavioral fingerprint of the spam-
bots generated by GenBot is similar to that of legitimate users, (ii)
a group containing both our evolved spambots and legitimate users
is almost indistinguishable from a group solely composed of legiti-
mate users, and (iii) the social fingerprinting detection technique
largely fails in detecting the evolved spambots. Moreover, 2 other
recent detection techniques, based on the content of posts [1, 35],
also fail in detecting the spambots generated by GenBot. These
results raise concerns towards the vulnerabilities of current state-
of-the-art techniques.
Finally, we studied the characteristics of the evolved spambots,
with the goal of answering to RQ3 – that is, looking for ways to im-
prove (at least a subset of) current detection techniques. Specifically,
we investigated whether the evolved spambots still had some pecu-
liar characteristics that would make them detectable. We noticed
that, although the group of evolved spambots behaves like a group
of legitimate users, the digital DNA of the spambots is more en-
tropic than that of legitimate users. Thus, we argue that it would be
possible and fruitful to extend current detection techniques by also
considering the amount of entropy within digital DNA sequences.
This last finding thus represents a useful suggestion for improving
current spambot detection techniques.
This study – the very first of its kind – moves in the direction of
a proactive spambot detection. For the first time since the advent of
OSNs, we have the chance to proactively study spambot evolutions
and to design more robust detection techniques, possibly capable
of withstanding the next evolutions of social spambots. Although
unlikely to completely defeat spambots and other malicious ac-
counts, the application of the proposed proactive approach would
nonetheless bring groundbreaking benefits. The capability to fore-
see possible spambot evolutions would not only allow to test the
detection rate of state-of-the-art techniques (including techniques
based, e.g., on the exploration of the social graph of the accounts,
or on their profiles and posting aptitudes), but also and above all,
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to a priori adapt them and even to design new detection techniques.
As a consequence of the additional design and experimentation
allowed by the proactive approach, many spambot evolutions will
be detected from day 0. Overall, spambots will see their chances
to harm severely restricted, with clear and immediate benefits for
our online environments, and ultimately, for our societies (e.g., less
fake news and biased propaganda). Notably, for those few spambot
evolutions still not foreseen by this proactive approach, we will
still be able to fall back to the traditional reactive approach, at no
additional cost.
7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
With the rise of AI, our daily lives are increasingly influenced by
decisions taken on our behalf by automated systems. Algorithmic fil-
tering (which leads to filter bubbles, echo chambers, and eventually
polarization), algorithmic bias and current limits in explainability
of predictive models already raise serious ethical concerns on the
development and adoption of AI solutions.
Within this context, algorithmic approaches to the characteri-
zation, development, and detection of social bots make no excep-
tion [17, 42]. For instance, one might naively think that all endeav-
ors devoted to the development of social bots are to be blamed.
Remarkably, however, not all social bots are nefarious by nature.
Indeed, as highlighted in [20], bots can be programmed to automat-
ically post information about news and academic papers [24, 32],
and even to provide help during emergencies [4, 39]. Undeniably,
the provision of useful services by benign bots will make them be-
come an established presence on social platforms [37]. Meanwhile,
other researchers investigated the development and the behaviors
of malicious bots [2, 15, 29, 33], in an effort to better understand
their evolution, impact and interactions with benign users. The
so-recognized existence of benign versus malicious bots sparked
heated debates about the rights of automated accounts. For instance,
both researchers and everyday social media users wondered the
extent to which social bots should be considered equal to humans,
as far as censorship6,7 and suppression of free speech [34] are
concerned.
While advancing the state of the art in the fascinating field of AI,
we are aware that the successful implementation of new technolo-
gies will pose greater challenges to discriminate between human
and automated behaviors. Now more than ever, spambot evolution
and their subsequent detection meet ethical considerations. The
framework proposed in this paper should not be seen merely as
a technical exercise. In fact, our evolved spambots have not been
conceived to support botnet developers (a criticism that could be
very well posed to all the above-cited research). Instead, we remark
that one of the main goals of this paper is to proactively sharpen
detection techniques to cope with future evolutions of spambots, as
typically done in the well-recognized field of adversarial learning.
Lastly, [50] clearly explains that “a supervised machine learning
tool is only as good as the data used for its training”. Since spambot
detection is a rapidly-evolving field, we are all involved in the
quest for up-to-date datasets. By playing with the parameters of the
6https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/technology/lawmakers-facebook-twitter-for
eign-influence-hearing.html
7https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/oct/16/facebook-political-activis
m-pages-inauthentic-behavior-censorship
evolutionary algorithm here proposed, we advocate the capability
to create a huge variety of fresh data, to re-train and fine-tune
existing detection mechanisms.
8 RELATEDWORK
Although representing an effective heuristic to solve complex opti-
mization problems [36], genetic algorithms usually require a string-
based genetic encoding of information to be applied. This require-
ment severely limited their applicability. Remarkably, in recent
years, we assisted to the proliferation of many studies on modeling
and analyzing online behaviors. A stream of research focused on
specific behavioral analytics tasks, such as detecting specific be-
havioral patterns [6, 27, 38], predicting future behaviors [30, 55],
and detecting anomalous ones [7, 11, 13, 45, 53, 54]. Others instead
achieved more general results. In [25] authors showed that individ-
uals have persistent and distinct online inter-event time distribu-
tions, while [16] focused on modeling human tweeting behaviors,
showing that such behaviors are very diverse and heterogeneous,
although far from being random. One result achieved in behavioral
analytics is the possibility to encode the behavioral information of
an account in a DNA-like string of characters [11, 16]. The charac-
terization of the behavior of both legitimate accounts and spambots
through this digital DNA modeling technique, coupled with the ca-
pability to carry out evolutionary simulations by means of genetic
algorithms, opens up the unprecedented opportunity to quantita-
tively study and experiment with spambot evolutions andmotivates
our research.
Meanwhile, progress has been made towards the detection of ma-
licious accounts (e.g., fakes, bots, spammers). As such accounts put
in place complex mechanisms to evade existing detection systems,
scholars tried to keep pace by proposing powerful techniques based
on profile- [5, 10, 54], posting- [5, 8, 11, 13, 22, 48], and network-
characteristics [5, 31, 47, 48, 51–53] of the accounts. However, until
now, new detection systems have been developed only as a conse-
quence of spambot evolutions [12]. In fact, no work has ever been
done towards studying, and possibly anticipating, such evolutions.
In other words, malicious accounts detection has always been tack-
led with a reactive approach, which is in contrast with the novel
proactive approach envisaged in this research.
9 CONCLUSIONS
We presented the first exploratory study to carry out a quantitative
analysis of spambot evolutions. Specifically, riding the wave of
the adversarial learning line of research, we first designed a novel
genetic algorithm for simulating spambot behavioral evolutions.
Then, we evaluated the extent to which the evolved spambots are
capable of evading 3 state-of-the-art detection systems, based on
evaluating the accounts’ behavior and the content of posts. Testing
the first system, results showed that as much as 79% of the evolved
spambots evade detection. Additionally, we also investigated the
characteristics of the evolved spambots, highlighting distinctive fea-
tures (e.g., entropy within digital DNA sequences) that would allow
to distinguish them from legitimate accounts. Considering these
features in current detection systems based on behavioral char-
acteristics of the accounts would make them more robust against
possible future spambot evolutions.
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Further experimentation with the proposed approach could lead
to new interesting results not only in bot design (e.g., chatbots),
but also and foremost in the development of spambot detection sys-
tems. Indeed, until now, researchers had to react to bot evolutions.
However, for the first time since the advent of OSNs, there is the
concrete chance to proactively tackle the challenging task of spam-
bot detection. Although here instantiated for a specific modeling
and detection technique based on the behavior of the accounts, we
thus argue that the proposed proactive approach will provide the
scientific community with the possibility to experiment with and
simulate future spambot evolutions, substantially raising the bar
for spambot developers.
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